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Judicialization and Health Policy in Colombia: The Implications for 
Evidence Informed Policy-making. 
Abstract 
The existence of the tutela mechanism and the endemic weaknesses of the legislative and 
executive branches of the Colombian state have led to a de facto judicialization of health 
policy-making. The objective of evidence informed policy is to identify effective policy 
approaches and legitimize policy decisions. Questions arise about the basis on which judges 
take decisions with significant policy and budgetary consequences, and the forms of 
evidence they use to inform these. This paper focuses on the extent to which Courts take 
account of research evidence in judgements and assesses the implications for health policy 
in Colombia. We place these discussions in the context of a broader analysis of the ongoing 
reforms to the Colombian health system and the most recent literature on evidence 
informed policy-making. The judicialization of health policy-making offers a sub-optimal 
means to achieve the objective of evidence informed policy-making. The emergence of a 
range of evidence advisory bodies in recent years is an attempt to address the issue of 
judicialization alongside the other constitutional and political weaknesses Colombia faces.  
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1. Introduction 
The role of scientific evidence in policy-making is a key focus of scholars in the field 
of health policy. The discourse of evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) reflects moves to 
understand the causes of social problems more accurately and to develop effective 
solutions to these (Lavis et al., 2008, Mitton et al., 2007b, Innvaer et al., 2002b, Oliver et al., 
2014). At the same time, it speaks to policy makers’ need to justify and legitimize their 
actions, and to ensure an effective use of limited public resources. A now extensive 
literature exists on EBPM within the field of health policy and beyond, with scholars from 
Weiss (1979) to Nutley and colleagues (2007) identifying a range of ways in which ‘evidence 
use’ or ‘research utilization’ occur and may be understood. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, debates about EBPM have focused predominantly on the 
role of the legislative and executive branches of the state, including the role of government 
bureaucracies, agencies and non-governmental stakeholders (e.g. civil society and non-
governmental organizations, corporations and business associations, professional bodies 
and activist networks) in the policy-making and legislative processes (Shaxson et al., 2012, 
see also Contandriopoulos et al., 2010, Innvaer et al., 2002a, Mitton et al., 2007a, Nutley et 
al., 2007, Walter et al., 2005). However, this legislative/executive nexus is not the only 
channel through which policy is made in contemporary settings. The judiciary, and judicial 
activism in sentencing, can have profound implications for the development of policy, which 
are largely ignored by the EBPM literature. The relevance of empirical evidence for court 
decisions, particularly in the context of judicial review by constitutional courts, has become 
a recent focus for legal scholars (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2016), but has received far less attention 
from political scientists and health policy analysts. 
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This article seeks to explore the implications of judicial activism for EBPM making 
through a case study of the Colombian Constitutional Court (CC) – regarded as one of the 
most powerful Constitutional Courts in the world (Landau, 2010) – and its impact on the 
development of health policy in that country. More specifically, it focuses on the use of the 
tutela mechanism – a protection writ through which any legal person can go before a 
relevant judge in the Civil, Criminal or Labor Courts and request protection of their 
constitutional rights (Cepeda-Espinosa, 2004: 552) – by Colombian citizens seeking provision 
of core health services and treatments. The article builds on the expanding body of 
scholarship on the judicialization of health policy in Latin America in general  (Vargas-Peláez 
et al., 2014, Gargarella, 2013, Wang, 2013, Menicucci and Machado, 2010, Biehl et al., 2012, 
Brinks and Forbath, 2014, Daniels et al., 2015, Ferraz, 2009, Figueiredo et al., 2013), and in 
Colombia more specifically (Uprimny, 2007, Nunes, 2010, Yamin and Parra-Vera, 2009, 
Yamin and Parra-Vera, 2010, Landau, 2010, González and Durán, 2011, Bernal et al., 2013, 
Cepeda-Espinosa, 2004). 
We argue that while the court system, with the CC at its apex, has played a vital role 
in the expansion of health care provision to Colombians – guaranteeing their 
constitutionally determined rights to life and healthcare – the de facto shift of key health 
policy decisions about the allocation of scarce public resources has significant implications 
for the goal of EBPM and the drive for efficiency and legitimacy of decision making which 
underlies it. One response to this would be to shift the locus of decision making back 
towards the legislative and executive branches in which evidence can more easily be 
brought to bear on decisions through established processes and practices. While this offers 
an apparently rationale solution in principle, it fails to take adequate account of the specific 
problems which have beset Colombian politics, and led the courts to assume their current 
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quasi-legislative function. Constitutional weaknesses and widespread corruption have 
meant successive governments have lacked the political will or capacity to address the 
issues of health coverage and sustainability. In this context, Colombia has seen a shift 
towards the ‘technocratization’ of health policy-making through the outsourcing of key 
decisions about the allocation of resources to semi-autonomous government agencies 
tasked with the evaluation and synthesis of relevant evidence for decision making. While 
this raises questions about democratic accountability, the institutionalization of evidence 
use in this way offers a potential route out of the current issues associated with judicialized 
policy-making while reducing the impacts of the constitutional and political weaknesses 
within the legislative-executive nexus.  
 
2. Evidence Based to Evidence Informed Policy-making 
This article situates itself in relation to two principle bodies of literature. The first 
seeks to theorize the role of evidence in the formation of public policy. Given the specific 
focus of the article on health policy, the discussion of this literature focuses on recent 
studies of evidence use by health policy makers. The second focuses on processes of 
judicialization: the increasing involvement of the judiciary in recent decades in the 
formation and implementation of public policy. Recently, the language of evidence-based 
policy-making has given way to evidence informed policy-making (EIPM) (see Oxman et al., 
2009). This shift in tone recognizes the fundamentally political nature of the policymaking 
process in which there are multiple, competing values and political priorities at play, often 
with their own supporting evidence bases (Barnes and Parkhurst, 2014). Advocates of 
different causes may draw on valid evidence to highlight the need for action on a given issue 
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and the effectiveness of specific policy measures in addressing these problems. Policy 
makers, meanwhile, must decide on which of these issues to prioritize and where to allocate 
finite resources. They may be presented with multiple bodies of valid evidence about the 
importance of multiple policy issues, and/or the different effects of a range of interventions 
and must weigh up which issues to address and the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different ways to do this (see Hawkins and Parkhurst, 2016). The language of EIPM reflects 
the increasing recognition that while policy should be made in light of relevant bodies of 
research evidence, the direction of policy cannot be determined by that evidence. This 
recalls Deborah Stone’s (1997) observation that policy controversies are often debates 
about values masquerading as facts. However, the logic of EIPM retains a clear emphasis on 
the importance of evidence use in generating effective, cost-effective and legitimate 
policies.   
Building on the acceptance that policies cannot be derived from evidence alone, 
Hawkins and Parkhurst (2016) have developed a process based account of evidence use 
based on the concept of ‘good governance’. The good governance of evidence recognizes 
that policy makers may take decisions which seem to contradict the prevailing evidence 
base, but this does not necessarily mean that this evidence has been disregarded or ignored, 
or that this is an example of poor legislative practice. While there may be a sound body of 
evidence that policy measure A would be effective in tacking issue X, there may 
nevertheless be valid reasons for pursuing another course of action. For example, the policy 
in question may be of lower political priority (or have lower levels of popular support) than 
another policy issue which may be addressed instead of, but not as well as, issue X. 
Alternatively, the externalities from pursuing policy measure A may be so significant that 
politicians (and the public they represent) may reject them on balance. Perhaps the policy 
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would contravene deeply held social values or ethical principles, e.g. personal autonomy or 
dignity (e.g. the choice to engage in harmful activities such or to refuse medical treatment). 
It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which there is evidence for a policy intervention 
being effective but, nonetheless, rejected because it is seen as morally objectionable (e.g. 
opposition to clean needle exchange programs), or may have deleterious economic 
consequences (e.g. significant restrictions on the use of motor vehicles to reduce air 
pollution). 
The good governance of evidence suggests that the decision to reject a given body of 
evidence is acceptable in such cases, but that policy makers have an obligation to identify 
and consider relevant bodies of evidence in making their decisions, and to explain and 
justify their decision to apply or set aside its findings. A ‘good’ use of evidence, therefore, 
does not equate to the decision to follow the course of action indicated by a specific body of 
evidence, but that policy decisions should be taken in light of all relevant bodies of 
evidence, in an open and transparent manner, acknowledging explicitly the role specific 
bodies of evidence played in reaching the decision adopted (Hawkins and Parkhurst, 2016). 
This in turn allows policy decisions, and the evidence on which they are based, to be 
scrutinized and contested, and policy makers to be held to account for the choices they 
make. 
Analogies with the ‘good governance of evidence’ can be found in Daniels and 
Sabin’s (2008) ‘accountability for reasonableness’ framework which attempts to set out 
procedural guidelines for decision making about the allocation of resources in health 
systems. This is particularly the case given the application of the good governance 
framework to the case of Colombia health policy in which the issue of evidence use if closely 
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allied to questions of priority setting and resource allocation. However, an important 
distinction exists between the processes of normative reasoning about the right allocation 
of finite researches undertaken by Daniels and Sabin and their critics (see for example 
Friedman, 2008) and the process based account of how evidence may be used to inform 
policy decisions for this (and other) purposes set out in the good governance framework.  
 
3. The Judicialization of Politics 
There is now an extensive literature on the judicialization of politics across policy-
making domains (Vallinder and Tate, 1995, Ginsburg, 2008, Hirschl, 2008a, Hirschl, 2008b, 
Hirschl, 2006, Hirschl, 2004) including an expanding sub-literature on this phenomenon in 
Latin America (Sieder et al., 2005, Rios-Figueroa and Taylor, 2006, Uprimny, 2007, Ryan, 
2010, Scribner, 2010, Menicucci and Machado, 2010, Couso et al., 2010, Saavedra-Herrera, 
2013, Vale, 2013, Daniels et al., 2015). While it is beyond the scope of this article to review 
the scholarship in this field exhaustively, it provides important context for the analysis 
presented here.  
More recently, scholars have begun to focus on both the implications of 
judicialization for evidence use in policymaking and vice versa - the increasing awareness 
amongst the judiciary about the norms of evidence use in policymaking and the impact this 
has on their judgements. This is particularly pertinent in the realm of judicial review of 
legislation. Alemanno (2013) has identified what he terms instead ‘an evidence based 
judicial reflex’ in the reasoning of courts engaged in judicial review of government 
legislation. He coined this term to identify a heightened sensitivity of judges to the 
increased importance of evidence use in the legislative process and, with this, a willingness 
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to strike down laws which have not adhered to established norms of evidence informed 
policy-making, i.e. where decisions have not been taken in light of the relevant bodies of 
evidence which the government would be expected to consider. 
Bar-Siman-Tov (2016) goes further than Alemanno, highlighting what he terms an 
increasing move towards ‘evidence based judicial review’ (EBJR) amongst constitutional 
courts in various domains across the globe, adding a substantive dimension to the 
procedural engagement with evidence use identified by Alemanno. Following Alemanno 
(2013), EBJR may concern the procedures through which a piece of legislation was adopted, 
and its constitutionality will depend on whether the legislative body adopted the measures 
in light of relevant evidence and in keeping with established processes of evidence informed 
policy-making in the domain in question (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2016). However, evidence use is 
relevant to EBJR in a second, more substantive, way, which implies that judges themselves 
will evaluate the necessity and merits of the law in light of relevant research evidence. For 
example, Courts may need to assess the proportionality of the law, if it is necessary for, and 
is likely to be effective, in achieving its stated objectives, and should base its decisions on 
empirical evidence (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2016). This implies in turn a research gathering or 
interpreting role for the court, in which they exercise potentially significant influence over 
the substantive content of public policy. 
This two dimensional conception of evidence use reflects the increasing awareness 
amongst jurists that rulings of this nature depend on a mixture of normative and empirical 
judgements which requires recourse to relevant scientific and social scientific knowledge. 
Niels Petersen (2013), for example, has focused on the specific role of social science 
evidence in constitutional court rulings. While the US Supreme Court has a long history of 
using social science evidence in its judgments, this is far less the case in other countries.  
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Despite the clear need for social science perspectives to inform judgements, Courts often 
lack the necessary expertise to evaluate and apply the findings from such research. In this 
context, judges are faced with three options: they can attempt to interpret social facts on 
their own, they can defer to the decisions of the legislature as the body best placed to weigh 
up evidentiary concerns against societal values and political priorities, or they can defer the 
question to social science experts. In practice, Petersen concludes, none of these strategies 
will lead to optimal outcomes and judges will need to employ a combination of different 
strategies. Petersen’s contribution links to an associated literature on the deliberative 
capacity of constitutional courts, and the impact of judicial rulings on the wider democratic 
process (see Mendes, 2013).  
Within different constitutional systems, the judiciary plays widely differing roles, 
with differing capacities to shape laws and policy. In Colombia, the importance of the CC as 
a health policy actor emerges in the context of a weak, ineffective government, which has 
suffered from widespread corruption in addition to its constitutional deficiencies (OECD, 
2013, Lizarazo and Londono, 2009). The CC has stepped into this vacuum to tackle crucial 
policy issues, which the other branches of government have proven unable or unwilling to 
address (Lizarazo and Londono, 2009, OECD, 2013, Cepeda-Espinosa, 2004). As such, the  
court has arguably articulated popular demands for health coverage more effectively than 
the legislative or executive branches of the state, leading to a progressive expansion of 
healthcare provision (Yamin and Parra-Vera, 2010). However, this has had significant 
implications on the financial sustainability of the health system, as well as raising concerns 
about the safety and effectiveness of treatments and equity of service provision (Vargas-
Peláez et al., 2014). Questions of this type are often resolved with recourse to relevant 
bodies of evidence (e.g. on drug efficacy) to determine which treatments are provided to 
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whom and on what basis. The shift away from decision making via the legislative and 
executive branches towards the judiciary has potentially significant implications for 
evidence use. Consequently, the process through which the CC reaches its decisions, and 
the role played by scientific evidence within this, warrants further investigation and 
consideration.  
 
4. Methods 
While there is an emerging engagement with questions of evidence use amongst 
legal scholars, less attention has been paid to these issues in the field of public policy. This 
article aims to examine the implications of judicialization of health policy-making for the 
implementation of evidence informed health policy from this perspective. This paper 
emerges from a six country comparative case study of evidence use in health policy-making 
in high, middle and low income settings, which examines the processes through which 
evidence informs policy in different constitutional, political and institutional settings. In each 
country, we analyze key health policy issues, which offer insights into the role of evidence in 
decision making at different points of the policy process and in different institutional 
settings. 
As is common practices in the field of policy studies, this article is informed by a non-
systematic literature review on the judicialization of policy-making in Colombia and beyond. 
Relevant articles were identified via keyword searches in the Web of Science database and 
via google scholar and snowballing technique was used to identify further articles through 
the reference lists of the articles identified and later publications citing them. In particular, 
we sought to identify studies of judicial activism in the area of health policy in Latin America. 
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Beyond Colombia, the region has a number of strong constitutional courts, which have 
exerted significant influence over the policy-making process and thus provide interesting 
parallels with the Colombian case. The purpose of this was to contextualize our analysis in 
the relevant bodies of scholarly literature in this area. 
In addition, we analysed key policy documents and “grey literature” related to the 
relevant health systems reforms. Our focus was principally on draft laws before the 
legislature and those already passed by the Colombian Congress between 1993 and 2014. In 
addition, we examined relevant documents from various organizations whose remits 
included healthcare and health provision and which sought to feed into to these policy 
debates (i.e. Inter-American Development Bank, Defensoría del Pueblo [the Human Rights 
Ombudsman]). Different publicly available sources, such as the official bulletin of the 
Congress of the Republic of Colombia and the online archive Congreso Visible were used to 
search, identify and retrieve relevant draft laws and those already enacted. 
We conducted 26 semi-structured interviews with health policy actors1 in Bogota in 
February 2014, including representatives of the main government ministries and agencies 
with responsibility for health policy-making, and policy advocates including representatives 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and industry associations. The focus of the 
interviews was on the use of evidence in health policy-making in general and were tailored 
to the specific policy area and expertise of the respondent (i.e. if they were a policy maker/ 
or decision maker versus a civil society advocate). Prior to the fieldwork, we had no 
                                                          
1 ‘Policy actors’ is employed in this article as an umbrella term to cover all participants in policy debates and 
the associated policy-making, implementation and evaluation processes. The terms thus includes policy 
makers (those in government, or government designated entities, performing key decision making or decision 
facilitating functions) as well as policy advocates (those outside of government advocating for specific policy 
objectives. 
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predetermined focus on specific policy issues or debates. We sought instead to elicit from 
respondents which areas they believed were the key issues in Colombian health policy; 
areas in which evidence had been well used to develop policy or conversely areas which 
would benefit from more effective evidence use and mechanisms to bring evidence into the 
policy process. As such, the interviews were inductive in nature and interview guides were 
framed in general issue areas but with scope for follow up and probe questions to explore 
issues which arose during the interview. These interviews were anonymized, transcribed 
and analysed using Nvivo software to identify the emergence of key themes. Coding also 
proceeded inductively and was undertaken by BH, so no issue of inter-coder reliability, 
although a small number of issues of interpretation arose and were checked with AAR to 
clarify respondents’ intended meaning. All transcripts were initially read to identify key 
themes which were recorded and used to develop a list of codes (or ‘nodes in Nvivo terms) 
which were used for a systematic analysis of the transcripts in phase 2. During the drafting 
phase all quotations used were check with AAR to ensure interpretation of the material and 
the use of the code was appropriate to support the point being made References to the 
interviews in the current text are also anonymized in keeping with the ethical guidelines for 
the project, but the sector from which each respondent emerges is given to contextualize 
their insights and perspective. 
 
5. The Colombian Health System: A Case of Perpetual Reform 
The current Colombian health system was brought into effect by Law 100/1993, 
which sought to improve the quality of health service and to address the widespread lack of 
coverage for large sections of the population which persisted under the previous regime 
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(Giedion and Uribe, 2009). Law 100 established a two tier insurance system – a contributory 
regime for those in employment and a subsidized regime for those without formal 
employment – centered on multiple private insurers and service providers under a 
regulated competition model (Escobar et al., 2009, Chernichovsky et al., 2012, Bernal et al., 
2012, Glassman et al., 2009). Law 100 also brought into existence a defined package of 
health benefits (Plan Obligatorio de Salud, POS), which all health insurers must provide.2 An 
equivalent benefits package for the subsidiary regime was also introduced (Plan Obligatorio 
de Salud Subsidiario, POSS) (Yamin and Parra-Vera, 2009).  
The design of the new health system was highly controversial during the 
development and passage of Law 100 and contestation over the organization and delivery of 
healthcare continued after its implementation (González-Rossetti and Bossert, 2000). 
Agreement on the basic assumptions underpinning the health system has never existed in 
Colombia and its virtues and deficiencies are widely debated by stakeholders (Defensoria 
del Pueblo, 2013: 83). According to one commentator, “seismic ideological disagreements” 
have remained on issues such as the financing of the system (i.e. insurance versus taxation 
based models); the involvement of the private sector; and whether limits can and should be 
placed on the right to health care (Author Interview, Health Consultant).  
The ideological tensions at the heart of Colombian health policy debates – and the 
significant challenges posed in providing adequate health coverage in such an economically, 
geographically and ethnically diverse middle income country with a history of armed conflict 
– has meant that the health system has faced an almost constant series of reforms since its 
                                                          
2 In this article we use the Spanish acronyms current in policy debates in Colombia. In the text we give both the 
English and Spanish names of organisations to make the article accessible to as wide an audience as possible 
and avoid confusion. 
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inception, which continue to the present day (Bernal et al., 2012, Giedion and Uribe, 2009, 
Hernández, 2005, Hernández and Torres-Tovar, 2010, Rodríguez Garavito, 2012). However, 
none of the successive attempts at reform have managed to resolve the underlying 
weaknesses in the current system or the ensuing ideological debates about its design. Policy 
debates have centered on two key issues facing the system: the lack of access to effective 
healthcare, and significant economic pressures faced by the system due to the expansion in 
service provision (Chernichovsky et al., 2012). 
Despite increases in health coverage brought about by Law 100, large sections of the 
population remain without access to adequate healthcare (Bernal et al., 2012, Giedion and 
Uribe, 2009).  Even those covered by the health insurance system remain unable to access 
certain services and treatments. In part, this results from the lack of clarity in the definition 
of the benefits package and the existence of significant grey areas over what treatments 
are, and are not, included (Yamin and Parra-Vera, 2010). The failure of successive 
governments to address these issues, along with the extensive rights guaranteed to citizens 
in the 1991 Constitution, have led many citizens to turn to the Courts in their attempts to 
secure access to health services. In particular, citizens have had recourse to the tutela 
process; a protection writ through which citizens are in an attempt to guarantee their 
constitutional rights, including the right to healthcare (Cepeda-Espinosa, 2004). However, 
the uneven access to legal services, and the means to pursue tutela actions, has led to 
greater inequality in access to health services, exacerbating one of the fundamental 
problems of the system, which successive reform agendas have sought to address. As will be 
examined below, the significant increase in the use of tutelas to access health services in the 
15 
 
period from 2000 to 20083  has created additional financial pressure on the health system, 
with significant implications for public finances (Chernichovsky et al., 2012, Rodríguez 
Garavito, 2012, Uprimny and Durán, 2014). As well as the need to control costs, it has 
created additional pressure to reform the health system in order to reduce the use of 
tutelas, and to create more equitable and sustainable mechanisms for allocating resources. 
At the same time, various decisions by the constitutional court have overruled or struck 
down proposed reforms, underlining its position as a key veto player in the Colombian 
political system (Tsebelis, 2002). 
 
6. Evidence Use in Colombian Health Policy 
The history of health systems reform in Colombia demonstrates that, in the last two 
decades at least, a clear belief has emerged amongst decision-makers about the importance 
of EIPM for ensuring efficiency in the health system (Dargent, 2014, Castro, 2014). While not 
reducible to this sole objective, much of the shift towards EIPM in Colombia is associated with 
the need to place limits on the health services accessible to citizens and to devise fair and 
equitable mechanisms for prioritizing the allocation of finite resources.  
The various reforms to the health system have introduced a number of mechanisms 
through which evidence enters in to the formulation of health policy and a range of 
different institutional structures for generating, processing and operationalizing policy 
relevant evidence. Many of the recent reforms to the health system have pursued the 
explicit objective of increasing and improving evidence use in policymaking. Law 1122/2007 
                                                          
3 In this time, the number of tutelas increased by around 570% (from 24,843 in 2000 to 142,957 in 2008). In 
addition, the share of tutelas related to health services also increased. While in 1999 the number of tutelas on 
health represented 18.5% of all tutelas, this increased to 41.5% in 2008. Moreover, between 2000 and 2008 the 
average growth rate of the number of tutelas per 1,000 affiliates to the health system increased from 1.1 to 3.6 
(Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2015; Uprimny & Durán, 2014; Rodríguez Garavito, 2012). 
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established the Regulatory Commission for Health (Comisión de Regulación en Salud, CRES); 
an arm´s length body affiliated to the Ministry of Health whose role included updating the 
POS. However, CRES received considerable criticism from both the media and the academic 
community due to its apparently inadequate use of evidence and the weakness of methods 
it employed in evaluating this evidence and reaching its decisions, as well as a lack of 
transparency in its decision-making processes (Castro, 2014: 22).  
The concept of Health Technology Assessment (HTA) was introduced by the 
government of President Santos in the second half of 2010 as a policy tool to inform coverage 
decisions on health technologies and the institutionalization of HTA that. The drive to set it 
up a modern HTA body in Colombia reflected international experience in establishing such 
bodies.  Indeed, a month after the President Santos’ election in August 2010, the Inter-
American Development Bank organized a delegation of senior executives from the UK’s 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) to Colombia to present the NICE model to 
Colombian policy makers and stakeholders.  
Following the visit by the NICE delegation, the Government set in motion the process 
of institutionalizing HTA in Colombia. To that end, the government submitted legislation to 
Congress January 2011.  The key focus of the draft law was the sustainability of the Colombian 
health system, and a key improving the information base and measuring the performance of 
the system was identified as the key mechanism through which to address this.   The resulting 
Law 1438, which came into effect in September 2012, set up the National Health Observatory 
(Observatorio Nacional de Salud, ONS), a directorate within the National Institute of Health 
(Instituto Nacional de Salud, INS) tasked with the generation of evidence to inform health 
policy and the Institute of Health Technology Assessment (Instituto de Evaluación de 
Tecnologías Sanitarias, IETS). Modelled on the NICE, IETS was established as a not-for-profit 
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public-private partnership (Corporación Sin Ánimo de Lucro, de Participación Mixta y de 
Carácter Privado under Colombian law). The symmetries between the two organizations are 
reflected in the appointment Hector Castro – a former project consultant at NICE 
International – as IETS’ first Chief Executive Officer. 
The participants in IETS include four public sector actors – the Ministry of Health 
(MSPS); The National Institute for the Surveillance of Medicines and Food  (Instituto Nacional 
de Vigilancia de Medicamentos y Alimentos, INVIMA); the INS; and the Administrative 
Department of Science, Technology and Innovation (Departamento Administrativo de 
Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación, Colciencias) – and two private sector members – the 
Colombian Association of Faculties of Medicine (Asociación Colombiana de Facultades de 
Medicina, ASCOFAME) and the Colombian Association of Scientific Societies (Asociación 
Colombiana de Sociedades Científicas).  
The role of IETS is to provide non-binding recommendations about health technologies 
and clinical practice. While there are no obligations on government to adhere to IETS’ advice, 
their recommendations carry significant political weight in policymaking. Its initial remit was 
to undertake health technology assessment in order to inform decisions made by the CRES 
on the inclusion and exclusion of treatments within the POS. However, only a few months 
later, in December 2012, the CRES was abolished and the Ministry of Health “re-assumed its 
role of resource-allocation decision-maker” (Castro 2014: 22; 131). This left IETS with the key 
task of providing non-binding recommendations to government about health technologies 
and clinical practice. Assessments of drug safety and market licensing are undertaken by 
INVIMA. Following the enactment of the National Development Plan 2014-2018 (brought into 
effect by Law 1753/2015), INVIMA is now responsible for monitoring the potential negative 
side effects of drugs and can now modify their indications on the basis of relevant scientific 
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evidence. This is particularly important in facilitating the access to "off-label” medicines. In 
addition, IETS is now tasked with undertaking economic (cost/benefit) evaluation of new 
drugs and medical devices as a prerequisite for obtaining a medical license. 
Interview respondents both within, and outside of, government indicated that the 
Ministry of Health possesses a relatively high level of technical capacity in the generation, 
interpretation and operationalization of research evidence (Author Interviews; various). In 
addition, the Ministry, along with other health sector actors, is able to draw on significant 
capacity and expertise, which exists within universities and research institutes, which 
undertake knowledge generation and synthesis for the government on a consultancy basis 
(Author Interview Colombian Academic; Author Interview Pharmaceutical Trade Association). 
These include: the Research Centre in Social Protection and Health Economics (Centro de 
Estudios en Protección Social y Economía de la Salud, PROESA, linked to the Universidad Icesi 
and the Fundación Clínica Valle del Lili); the Centre for Health Economics (Centro Economía 
Salud, CES, linked to Universidad de Antioquia); the Centre for Research on Development 
(Centro de Investigación de Desarrollo, CID, and the Universidad Nacional); the Universidad 
de los Andes; the Centre for Development Projects (Centro de Proyectos para el Desarrollo, 
CENDEX, at the Universidad Javeriana); and the Centre for Health Studies and Research 
(Centro de Estudios e Investigación en Salud at the Fundación SantaFe). In addition, the World 
Bank also has played an important advisory role, supporting the country with technical studies 
on different health issues including the definition of the health benefits packages, risk 
assessment, decentralization of health, and the development of health indicators through the 
funding of projects led by research centers.  
Government agencies such as IETS, INS and INVIMA exist for the specific purpose of 
making decisions on policy issues, which require a high degree of technical proficiency and a 
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detailed engagement with a relevant body of evidence. The expansion of these types of 
agencies across the globe is indicative of the increasingly complex nature of policy-making 
and regulation, especially in areas of rapid technical advancement such as health. The need 
for effective, evidence informed policies, and the limited specialist expertise of many 
elected representatives means decisions are delegated instead to designated specialist 
agencies. Removing decision-making competence from elected officials implies a loss of 
democratic oversight over policymaking, but this is often regarded as a price worth paying 
for more efficient decision-making and more effective policy, leading in turn to greater 
political legitimacy (Beetham, 2013). 
 The shift towards the goal of EIPM in Colombia reflects a more general shift towards 
rationalization of policy-making, which occurred initially in the North American and Western 
European contexts, in the search for more effective and efficient policy interventions. The issues of 
effective and cost control are closely connected. It was hoped that ‘better’ (more effective/ efficient) 
policy would also be more cost effective, producing the greatest possible impact from the resources 
available. In addition, the emergence of EIPM reflects the search for new sources of legitimacy for 
policies in the context of the declining authority of government, professional bodies and individual 
expertise. In the context of health policy, this involved an implicit rejection of the authority of 
individual physicians and their autonomy over clinical decisions, which were to be guided instead by 
‘the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research’ (Sackett et al., 1996). In 
Colombia, doctors, via their national trade association, perceived the shift towards EIPM, and the 
institutionalization of HTA, with a degree of suspicion given its potential to curtail their professional 
autonomy and their ‘freedom to prescribe’ (see Present Authors, under review). As will be discussed 
below, the expansionist rulings of the Courts demanding the provision of medical treatments 
prescribed to patients but denied by insurance providers – along with the weight placed by the 
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courts on the testimony of the attending physicians – has served to buttress the position of doctors 
in the wider power dynamics of Colombian health policy debates.  
 
7. The “Judicialization” of Health Policy in Colombia 
The Colombian judiciary is divided into a number of specialized sections, with the 
three principle jurisdictions each headed by a specific court of last instance (Cepeda-Espinosa, 
2004).4 The “administrative jurisdiction” resolves conflicts derived from the exercise of public 
administrative powers and is headed by the Council of State. The “ordinary jurisdiction” hears 
cases in the areas of civil, criminal and labor law and is headed by the Supreme Court of 
Justice, which presides over two other levels of court: municipal and circuit courts (courts of 
first instance), and district courts (second instance). A tutela action can be started at any 
municipal court. Finally, the “constitutional jurisdiction” is headed by the CC which is the 
highest judicial body in Colombia.  
The CC is given three principle responsibilities under the 1991 Constitution: (i) 
interpreting and preserving the integrity of the 1991 Constitution; (ii) safeguarding the 
rights of all citizens; (iii) maintaining a progressive, peaceful and fair society as envisioned 
during the formulation of the Constitution (Cepeda-Espinosa, 2004). In practice, the CC acts 
as the court of last instance in matters affecting the constitutional rights and obligations and 
reviews the constitutional validity of decisions taken in lower courts, as well as the 
constitutional compatibility of legislation and other executive decisions. In the case of 
tutelas, the CC reviews selected cases adjudicated by judges in lower courts.  
                                                          
4 The “disciplinary” jurisdiction is in charge of the branches’ organization and budget administration and 
disciplinary actions. It is headed by the Superior Council of the Judiciary. In addition, there are the special military 
criminal jurisdiction, the indigenous jurisdiction, and “judges of peace” (private citizens granted specific judicial 
powers by the Constitution and the law in minor cases)” (Cepeda-Espinosa, 2004). 
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Despite the attempts to rationalize and improve resource allocation through the 
reforms detailed above, problems of access to health services and the economic 
sustainability of the health system continue to endure. Both the legislative and executive 
branches of the state have proved ineffective in addressing these issues. Under its 1991 
constitution, Colombia has suffered from endemic weaknesses of both the legislative and 
executive branches of the state, resulting in an absence of effective policy responses to a 
range of pressing social issues. The weak, unstructured party system (Landau, 2010: 341, 
Leongomez, 2006), and endemic corruption amongst parliamentarians (Landau, 2010: 342, 
López and Sevillano, 2008) and a history of authoritarianism and political violence (Yamin 
and Parra-Vera, 2009: 147), has contributed to Congress’ consistent failure to perform its 
constitutionally mandated functions of initiating and enacting effective legislation, and 
holding the Executive to account (Landau, 2010: 362). Thus the legislature has failed to act 
as an effective mechanism through which citizens can articulate dissatisfactions with the 
health system and through which their needs and interests can be articulated, with 
Congress acting more as a veto-player (Tsebelis, 2002), stymying presidential policy 
initiatives rather than as an effective agent of policy change (Leongomez, 2006). Yamin and 
Parra Vera (2010) cite the process through which Law 100 itself was passed – in curtailed 
parliamentary debates lasting a matter of minutes, shoehorned into the legislative 
programme immediately before Christmas – as indicative of the inadequacy of Congress as a 
mechanism capable of responding to citizens’ concerns or as a focus for articulating popular 
concerns on key issues of public policy. Subsequent attempts to reform the health system 
between 2003 and 2007 have demonstrated similar deficiencies in the system (Bernal et al., 
2012).  
22 
 
Within this political vacuum, the court system, with the CC at its apex, has emerged as 
perhaps the most important policy set of actors in the Colombian political system (Author 
Interviews, Colombian Academic; Human Rights Ombudsman). David Landau (2010: 322) 
argues that the CC has viewed the political conditions in Colombia “as a license to become 
perhaps the most activist court in the world.” At times, the court has performed a quasi-
legislative role “injecting policy into the system, by managing highly complex, polycentric 
policy issues and by developing a thick construct of constitutional rights that it uses to check 
executive power” (Landau, 2010: 321). In so doing, the legislature has become a far more 
effective agent for political change, and reflecting popular will more closely, than the other 
branches of the state to which this function traditionally belongs (Landau, 2010: 328, Yamin 
and Parra-Vera, 2009).  
 The principal mechanism through which the CC has been able to expand its remit 
into areas which are usually the preserve of parliaments has been via the tutela process. 
While the constitution did not establish the right to health as a first order constitutional 
right, the jurisprudence of the court has expanded the right to health services in relation to 
the right to life. The CC held that cases in which the lack of access to health care treatment 
or drugs could endanger the life of the individual, constituted an indirect infringement of 
the right to life. Judges are required to give priority attention to tutela actions over other 
business before the court and pass judgement on the case within 10 days. In addition, 
judges can take preliminary decisions to prevent irreversible damage occurring to plaintiffs. 
As such, tutelas provide citizens with a quick, efficient, inexpensive and effective means of 
guaranteeing access to health services. The importance of the tutela process in the 
Colombian context, is underlined by the much higher number of processes brought in 
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Colombia than in other countries (e.g. Mexico) with a similar level of economic development 
or comparable level of judicial activism (Rodríguez Garavito, 2012: 519).  
The tutela process created a mechanism through which patients could seek to obtain 
treatments prescribed by doctors, but excluded from the POS. The effect of this was to expand 
the range of treatments, drugs and services within the POS (Yamin and Parra-Vera, 2009: 147), 
with clear financial implications for the health system. The Ministry of Health (2015) has 
estimated that around 37.5% of tutela cases involved attempts to access treatments excluded 
from the POS. Additional cases (0.5%) centered on demands for branded pharmaceuticals 
instead of generic equivalents included within the POS. Given the reliance of policy makers 
on scientific and technical expertise in deciding the content of the POS, it is these cases which 
are of most obvious relevance for the present focus on evidence use in the context of 
judicialized forms of policy-making. The overwhelming majority of judgements in tutelas on 
health are decided in favor of the patient (Rodríguez Garavito, 2012: 527). The Office of the 
Human Rights Ombudsman estimated in 2007 that over 80% of cases brought forward by 
patients were upheld by the CC (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2013). This has led to increased access 
to a range of services and treatments including provision of cancer and anti-retroviral drugs 
and covering the cost of treatment of patients overseas (Yamin and Parra-Vera, 2009: 148). 
From this perspective, the court is viewed as a key driver of progressive social change (Author 
Interview, NGO Sector). 
The increase in treatment provision brought about through the tutela process has had 
significant implications for public spending and the financial sustainability of the health 
system. The system of recovery (recobros) meant that in many cases health insurers were 
able to pass the costs of treatments provided via tutelas onto the central government. CC 
judgement SU-480/1998 allowed health insurers (EPS) to recover the costs of treatments 
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prescribed by a doctor, but not included in the POS, from the government’s Solidarity and 
Guarantee Fund (FOSYGA). The tendency of judges to find in favor of patients in tutela actions 
has led to significant increases in the provision of health services and treatments not included 
in the POS.  Since Judgement T-760/2008, the number of treatments and medicines not 
included in the POS has risen significantly. According to official estimates, the recobros for 
these treatments increased from COP$ 600 billion in 2007 (US$200 million) to COP$ 2.4 trillion 
in 2010 (US$ 800 million).  Since these costs have to be covered with public finances, this 
increase placed significant pressure on the financial sustainability of the health system 
(Fedesarollo, 2012). Between 2005 and 2010, 54% of the recobros requests were due to 
tutelas (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2015). However, more recently this 
percentage has decreased. Between 2009 and 2014 on average 21% of recobros were 
associated with tutelas/court orders (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2015).  
Successive governments have sought to address the consequences of this 
judicialisation of health policy, and to reduce the number of tutela actions, through various 
reforms. Law 1122/2007 sought to counter the expanding costs of healthcare through the 
introduction of Scientific and Technical Committees (CTCs) within the health insurers to 
evaluate requests for treatment from patients which are excluded from the POS. Where 
treatment is denied by the CTC, patients still had recourse to the tutela process, but the CTCs 
created an additional mechanism to resolve disputes about service provision without 
recourse to the courts. The introduction of CTCs represented an attempt by the Government 
to control the increasing costs associated with the expanding package of benefits. In those 
cases in which the relevant CTC had denied access to a specific treatment, procedure or drug, 
and the patient subsequently brought a successful tutela action to secure its provision, the 
EPS could only claim back 50% of the cost of the treatment, procedure or drug from the 
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government, as opposed to the full amount recoverable if approved by the CTC. Despite its 
intentions, Law 1122/2007 created an incentive for insurers to authorize all treatments 
requested by patients via the CTC, and thus failed to control health spending costs. While in 
2009 60% of recobros requested were due to CTC authorizations, by 2014 this share had 
jumped to 88% (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, 2015). Consequently, in April 2016 
the Ministry of Health decided to scrap the CTC, replacing them with an online system in 
which doctors have to report and explain the reasons for all prescriptions of treatments not 
included in the POS. The online database is designed to streamline the authorization 
processes for treatments, which previously took several weeks. In addition, the database will 
be used to monitor doctors’ prescribing patterns and censure those who unnecessarily 
prescribe high-cost treatments excluded from the POS.  
The period since 2008 has seen further attempts by both the government and the CC 
to adopt a “structural approach” to the right to health, with the aim of “de-judicializing” 
health care provision (Rodríguez Garavito, 2012). Judgement T-760/2008 introduced a new 
mechanism – “Complex Orders” (Órdenes Complejas) – in an attempt to orientate the 
judgements of lower courts through a structured route rather than on a case-by-case (casuist) 
basis. This same period has seen ongoing attempts to reform the health system, with the dual 
aims of increasing access to healthcare and ensuring the financial sustainability of the system. 
However, attempts to place limits on health spending by placing limits on the package of 
benefits available to citizens have been consistently thwarted by the CC and its tendency to 
rule in favor of plaintiffs’ right to health. 
 
8. Evidence Use in a Judicialized Health System 
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 From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the courts play a vital role in health 
policy-making in Colombia, determining the range of treatments and health services 
available to patients with significant budgetary implications. The de facto delegation of vital 
policy decisions to the courts raises important questions for evidence informed policy-
making. These relate to the ability and the disposition of judges to take into account 
relevant bodies of evidence on the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of treatments when 
ruling on their provision from public funds. Moreover, it concerns the extent to which 
judges (should) consider the broader political implications of their rulings, for example the 
sustainability of the health system and the implications of expanding health care costs for 
other areas of public policy.  
Judges, particularly in the lower courts, often lack dedicated resources, technical 
capacity and specialist training on the wide range of issues with which they are confronted 
(Bernal et al., 2013). In these cases, decisions are often based simply upon the opinion of 
the prescribing doctor that the treatment in question was medically necessary.  According 
to a former employee of the Ministry of Health, judges often rely on the prescribing doctors’ 
interpretations of the current state of medical knowledge about the treatment in question, 
with evidence supplied to the court by the doctors in question to support their initial 
decision (Author Interview, former Ministry of Health employee): 
For example, a doctor might have prescribed a medication that is not licensed in the country. 
The health care system regulation is clear that this type of drug cannot be covered, so the 
health insurer denies the patients access to it. Some patients would start a tutela action to get 
access to the prescribed drug, with the judge ruling in favor of the patient, ordering the insurer 
to import and provide the drug, using as evidence just the prescription and a summary written 
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by the doctor where he states that the drug is needed and that [denying the drug] poses a 
threat to the patients’ health. 
 
The reliance on the opinion of prescribing physicians assumes that their clinical 
decisions are grounded in sound evidence about the effectiveness and safety of the 
treatments they are administering in a context in which doctors vehemently defend their 
“freedom to prescribe” (Author Interview, GJM). Moreover, this approach seems to 
undermine the organizations and mechanism put in place to undertake independent reviews 
of this evidence and approve medications for specific indications (i.e. INVIMA). As many 
tutelas involve the refusal of health insurers to provide medication or services prescribed by 
physicians, the tendency for judges to defer to individual clinicians in this way partly explains 
why such a high percentage of tutela judgements rule in favor of the plaintiff. This has led to 
expansion in coverage, but also to significant additional costs of the health system. This 
potentially results in a sub-optimal use of health system resources through ineffective 
prescribing practices and may result in patients receiving inappropriate treatment. 
The Justices of the CC who review tutela actions do have mechanisms available to 
them through which to consult with experts, public officials and organizations before 
resolving, in order to “bring facts and conflicting perceptions of social reality to the Court´s 
attention” (Cepeda-Espinosa 2004: 556). The CC´s decision-making process thus brings the 
opportunity to present and incorporate relevant evidence within the decision-making process 
of the court. However, the way in which the CC appraises evidence is often problematic 
nonetheless, suffering from similar deficiencies as the lower order courts. A former employee 
of the Ministry of Health cites the case of a woman denied access to a drug for treating  
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chronic cystitis because it was not yet licensed in the country (Author Interview; see also 
judgement T-945/2004): 
In the court of first instance, the judge ruled against the patient on the basis that the 
regulations were clear that providing this type of drug is not allowed. The CC selected this 
tutela for review and changed the ruling in favor of the patient. The CC argues that the doctor 
that prescribed this drug used the best available evidence, thus it sees the doctor himself as 
representing the highest level of evidence. The CC court says that drugs should be provided 
when they are required based on the best available evidence even if they have not been 
licensed. Regulatory agencies have been set up to protect the population by allowing only 
drugs and devices that can show their safety, efficacy and quality to enter the market, and 
having someone accountable for its commercial use. These agencies –  in the case of Colombia 
it is INVIMA – have standardized procedures for the critical appraisal of the evidence 
presented by the producer to grant market access to ensure that benefits exceed the risk, thus 
using high quality evidence to support its decision.  
 
This is not an isolated case. For example, in case T-975/1999, the CC again sided with the 
evidence of the attending doctor, having heard evidence from a range of relevant medical 
organizations and scholars. This went against the decision of the lower courts to deny 
treatment on the grounds that the treatment in question had not been approved by INVIMA.  
In these cases, the CC appears not to distinguish adequately between different types 
of evidence, placing significant faith in the interpretation of the prescribing doctor. As in 
other countries (see for example Baggot 2007), doctor´s specialist expertise, high social 
status, political contacts and strong representative organizations have granted Colombian 
physicians significant influence over health policy. In keeping with this, the GJM, which 
defends the professional autonomy of prescribing doctors, enjoys significant political 
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influence as the combined voice of the entire Colombian medical establishment. This 
reflects a tendency by the court to assume that the attending physician has the best overall 
understanding of the case at hand and to privilege their opinion over that of the key 
institutions in the evidence advisory system. While this may be true in terms of the clinical 
history and the particular circumstances of the patient in question, it does not follow from 
this that the doctor is best placed to judge the effectiveness and/or safety of the drugs in 
questions, or their appropriateness for off label usage. Yet judgements about the safety and 
efficacy of a drug reached through a critical appraisal by the designated regulatory 
authority, INVIMA, are often overruled by the courts. 
 The preceding discussion underlines that the judiciary is informed by a very different 
set of norms and priorities to the legislative and executive branches. Within the CC, for 
example, justices act to guarantee individual rights in specific cases through its interpretation 
of the constitution, but it is beyond the court’s remit or competence to take into 
consideration the wider implications of a ruling on the health system or the allocation of 
resources within society. This includes the willingness to overrule limits placed on treatments 
by the government. In case T-945/2004, for example, the CC is very clear about the priority of 
fundamental rights over what it terms ‘legal or administrative regulations’ which may 
undermine these rights. The court is ill placed to take complex political decisions between 
competing needs and imperatives in the context of limited resources. However, the 
cumulative effect of its rulings on individual cases has long term distributive effects (Yamin, 
2014). This reflects findings about the ability of activist courts in the US context to make 
effective social policies (Horowitz, 1977a) and, in particular, their ability to process relevant 
facts and different forms of evidence related to the resolution of these complex issue 
(Horowitz, 1977b).  The above analysis is also in keeping with the findings of Vargas-Pelaez 
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and colleagues (2014) that judicialized forms of decision-making on access to medicines can 
lead to a suboptimal use of resources and create significant financial pressure on the health 
system.  
 
9. Addressing the Consequences of Judicialized Health Policy-making 
According to Landau (2010: 344), the CC is aware of the quasi-legislative role it has 
come to assume under the 1991 constitution and has sought to increase the legitimacy by 
“assuming some legislative-like attributes”, including the information-gathering and 
monitoring functions usually assumed by legislatures. The wide range of cases brought before 
the CC via the tutela process means the court is confronted with information on a wide range 
of social issues affecting Colombian society. The CC has also engaged extensively with the 
Human Rights Ombudsman, and other civil society groups and NGOs, in order to gather and 
assess information in important policy areas (Landau, 2010: 344). The Court has used a variety 
of techniques to gather policy-relevant information in order to assess the constitutional 
compatibility of different legislative measures, including issuing orders to request information 
from the various governmental and non-governmental agencies, particularly about how much 
money they are spending on the problem and how they are spending it (Landau, 2010: 360). 
Perhaps most notably from the perspective of the current paper, the CC has also held its own 
legislative-style hearings: 
In July 1999, the Court held a public hearing on the issue of reforming housing finance 
system in the style of a legislative committee or an administrative agency, in which it heard 
from about twenty-five leaders and officials, including the Colombian ombudsman, the 
Minister of Housing, the Head of the Colombian Central Bank, several deputies and senators, 
the heads of various trade groups, and the head of a labor union association. In addition, 
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throughout the process the Court requested—and received—written comments on the 
problem at issue from an extraordinary number of figures, including economists, academics, 
public officials, and civil society groups (Landau 2010: 357). 
 
Yamin and Parra Vera (2010) highlight that the actions of the courts in attempting to 
ensure the right to health has had the effect of promoting debate about the right to health 
in Colombia and have thus provided much of the impetus for the proposed reforms to the 
system, including the institutionalization of evidence use detailed above. At the same time, 
it has tried to create greater coherence and consistency in its own jurisprudence, for 
example through ruling T-760/2008 which sought to clarify the outer limits of the right to 
health services and “ to make those grey zones [in the POS] less grey” (Yamin and Parra-
Vera, 2010: 113).  
Since 2012 the government has taken a number of steps to increase access to 
healthcare. In addition to abolishing CTCs and the reforms to the INVIMA discussed above, 
the Ministry of Health has periodically updated the contents of the POS and has sought to 
improve understanding within the medical community about precisely which treatments it 
contains. In addition, more resources have been allocated in order to increase the supply of 
health services in rural areas and outside of the main cities, and remotely accessible medical 
services (‘telemedicine’) are being promoted. Moreover, a new healthcare model (known as 
MIAS), based on the idea of comprehensive health risk management and the recent evidence, 
has been implemented since 2014. The government also liquidated two of the largest health 
insurers, Saludcoop and Caprecom, which had been associated with serious problems 
concerning access to healthcare services. 
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Despite these developments, the question remains whether the mechanisms put in 
place by the CC are sufficient to ensure that effective, evidence informed public policies are 
made. Setting aside the wider concerns about the democratic accountability and legitimacy 
associated with judicial activism of the kind engaged in by the CC, it can be argued that 
legislating through the judiciary in this way represents a sub-optimal form of policy-making.  
In principle, the processes and mechanisms which exist within the legislative/ executive 
domain provide more appropriate conditions for the development of legitimate, evidence-
informed policies in which the interests of citizens can be aggregated, and competing calls of 
resources weighed up against one another in light of evidence about the impact of each policy 
problem and the effective ness of proposed responses. The current state of affairs in 
Colombia, in which the courts have assumed this quasi legislative function, has emerged  as a 
result of the  structural weaknesses and extensive corruption within both the legislative and 
the executive. It is also crucial to highlight that many tutela cases do not arrive at the CC for 
adjudication, but have significant consequences for the health system. Issues around the 
effectiveness of evidence in lower order courts are not affected by reform processes in the 
CC.  
To fully examine the implications of judicialization of policy-making for the use of 
evidence, it is informative to return to the concept of the ‘good governance’ of evidence set 
out above and to assess the extent to which the judicialized policy-making model in Colombia 
fulfils this. The good governance of evidence model suggests that EIPM should be assessed in 
terms of the appropriateness of the evidence used to inform decisions, the transparency of 
the decision-making process and the contestability of decisions, and should hold decision 
makers to account. 
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These criteria envisage a parliamentary model of decision-making in which elected 
assemblies serve as a mechanism through which citizens are able to hold legislators and the 
executive to account, and which function as a point of contestation for policy decisions. In 
Colombia, Congress has consistently failed to fulfil this function, with the CC emerging not 
just as an agent for policy change, but as a focus for the articulation of popular needs and 
desires. Yet despite the legitimacy of the CC in the eyes of many citizens, the CC lacks 
mechanisms of popular control and oversight. There is no obvious form of recourse by which 
judges can be held to account for their decisions or by which a system that systematically 
favors the interests of those with access to legal means of redress can be curtailed and 
reformed to reflect principles of fairness and equity. As we have seen above, it has proved 
extremely difficult for the government to reverse decisions or to introduce changes to the 
allocation of health benefits in the face of contradictory CC rulings.   
In addition, the types of evidence used by judges are not necessarily the most 
appropriate, relying for example on the view of a prescribing doctor over the overall body of 
evidence on the efficacy and cost effectiveness of the drug. The CC has taken measures to 
improve evidence use by holding public hearings, but its structures are not designed to 
undertake the kind of evidence review which policy bureaucracies and parliaments can 
undertake. Similarly, while the recent decisions made by the CC have sought to create more 
consistency in sentencing and to set some limits on the constitutional right to health, the 
Court is not designed to evaluate the competing claims of different social groups to finite 
resources. This type of deliberative, evidence informed debate can occur much more 
effectively in parliamentary settings which facilitate citizen engagement and oversight. 
Instead judges have tended to rule on the validity of claims to a certain treatment in 
isolation from broader concerns about the public interests and the sustainability of public 
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finances. As such they are not taking into account all the relevant evidence for the decisions 
they are taking which are framed in very different terms by jurists than they would be by 
policy makers who have to take a wider conception of the public good. 
The conclusion that the legislative-executive nexus represents a more appropriate 
set of institutional structures to make evidence informed policy than courts must, however, 
acknowledge that this is not always the case in practice. In Colombia, for example structural 
and constitutional weaknesses, allied with political corruption, have meant the parliament 
and the executive have failed to perform these legislative functions effectively, with the 
courts stepping into this vacuum to resolve pressing health care issues.  In this context, any 
moves to curtail the quasi-judicial role must acknowledge the conditions in which this 
emerged and look to address the more fundamental issues in the political system, which 
brought this about. The moves towards technocratic forms of decision making, in the form 
on institutions such as CRES and IETS, represent an attempt to shift policy decisions away 
from the courts into structures more adequately designed for this purpose, whose 
legitimacy is derived from the evidence on which their decisions are based. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 The judiciary, with the CC at its apex, plays a vital role in the development of health 
policy in Colombia with significant consequences both for the provision of health services 
and for public spending. To a large extent, this reflects the shortcomings of the executive 
and legislative in providing effective responses to key policy problems identified by citizens. 
Within a context of finite resources, and a constitutionally guaranteed right to health 
services (pertaining to the right to life), this raises important issues of equity and social 
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justice. Can limits be placed on the provision of health benefits which are in keeping with 
the fundamental tenets of the constitution? If limits are to be placed on the availability of 
health services, on what basis should these decisions be made and how can they be justified 
to the citizens affected by them? 
Within modern forms of government, recourse is often made to scientific evidence 
to arbitrate in such cases. The shift towards evidence informed policymaking, or at least a 
rhetorical commitment to it, is driven by a desire for more effective and efficient policies 
but reflects also the need for governments to find widely accepted sources of legitimacy for 
their decisions. Relevant bodies of evidence may clarify both the effectiveness and cost 
effectiveness of specific treatments, in isolation and in relation to other treatments which 
could potentially be funded from the same pot of money. The development of the evidence 
advisory systems is designed to provide policy makers with relevant, high-quality 
information on which to base their decisions. As in Colombia, governments may put in place 
specialist regulatory agencies, or call on panels of experts, to examine this evidence and 
advise decision makers. At other times, decisions on the provision of specific treatments or 
their inclusion in the benefits package may be delegated to non-governmental or quasi-non-
governmental agencies. 
Debates about the role of evidence in policy-making have largely neglected the role 
of the judiciary in the development of law and policy. In cases such as Colombia, in which an 
activist constitutional court has had a significant impact on health and public policy, this 
represents a significant gap in our understanding of the way evidence shapes policy. This 
paper begins the process of addressing that gap by examining the role of the judiciary, and 
the CC more specifically, in the development of Colombian health policy. In so doing it raises 
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questions about the relationship between the executive, legislative and the judiciary, and 
the role of evidence in the execution of their responsibilities. It appears to be extremely 
difficult to implement evidence informed policies, which seek to manage the allocation of 
finite resources, in a context in which the decision making space is so extensively 
circumscribed by the decisions of the judiciary. Moreover, it is outside the remit of the CC to 
consider issues of financial sustainability when interpreting the Constitution and applying 
the rights of citizens to health services.  
Arguably, the CC has been a driving force for social justice in a country in which other 
political institutions have often failed the population, and vulnerable or marginalized groups 
in particular. However, the almost continuous process of reform the health system has 
undergone since its creation points to the significant underlying issues which the 
government faces in securing the ongoing financial viability of the health service. Evidence 
informed policy-making offers a potential route for imposing limits on healthcare in a 
rational, equitable and legitimate manner. The ability of policies to be made in light of this 
evidence in an open and transparent manner in which decision makers can be held to 
account for their actions appears to be undermined by the judicialized nature of policy-
making in Colombia. That said, the constitutional weaknesses and endemic corruption which 
has beset Congress means that there is no simple solution to the status quo. The reason the 
CC emerged as a powerful actor in health is due to the failure of the legislative-executive 
nexus. Recent attempts to institutionalize evidence use through semi-autonomous agencies 
such as IETS represent a clear attempt to develop new forms of evidence informed decision 
making. While this technocratic approach raises questions about democratic accountability, 
it offers a more effective means of ensuring EIPM and an efficient allocation of resources 
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than the current reliance on the tutela mechanism and the outsourcing of policy decisions 
to the judiciary. 
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